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Abstract
We study the tit-for-tat dynamic in production markets, where each player can make
a good given as input various amounts of goods in the system. In the tit-for-tat dynamic,
each player allocates its good to its neighbors in fractions proportional to how much they
contributed in its production in the last round. Tit-for-tat does not use money and was
studied before in pure exchange settings [WZ07].
We study the phase transitions of this dynamic when the valuations are symmetric (i.e.
each good has the same worth to everyone) by characterizing which players grow or vanish
over time. We also study how the fractions of their investments evolve in the long term,
showing that in the limit the players invest only on players with optimal production capacity.
1 Introduction
The tit-for-tat strategy has been studied extensively in repeated games, where two agents play-
ing tit-for-tat adjust their behavior to match that of their opponent in the past. For example, in
the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma, the choice of a player is between cooperation and retaliation.
An agent playing tit-for-tat will cooperate as long as the their opponent cooperates as well,
and will subsequently copy the previous action of the other agent. More generally, a tit-for-
tat strategy prescribes proportional retaliation to avoid escalation of conflict. Axelrod [Axe06]
studies tit-for-tat to explain how high levels of cooperation can be achieved in groups of animals
and human societies even when each individual player is selfish. Tit-for-tat can also be used to
study economic policies such as setting tariffs between countries, where an increase in tariffs by
one country is followed by corresponding increases in tariffs by other countries.
Figure 1: Tit-for-tat in two markets with n = 50 players. Each player i starts with an initial
amount xi(0) of good i and a way of distributing its good given by a vector ~yi(0), where yi,j(0) is
the fraction player i gives to player j (from good i) at round 0. The players repeatedly exchange
goods, produce their good from the bundles acquired, and then update the fractions according to
the tit-for-tat rule. The picture shows the fractions yj,i(t), which have large oscillations.
In production economies there is a set of n players, each of which starts with some amount
of an eponymous good and a production recipe. The players can produce their own good given
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as input a bundle of various amounts of goods from the market. In the simple case of additive
production, there is a matrix ~a so that player i can make ai,j units of its good given as input
one unit of good j.
The production economy model was studied first by Von Neumann [vN46] and Gale [Gal76]
at the steady state, where the economy expands by the same factor as time progresses. Local
dynamics in this type of market were recently studied in [BMN18], where the players are starting
with some arbitrary way of investing in goods and repeatedly adapting their investments based
on past performance.
Contribution. Our contribution is to study the tit-for-tat dynamic in production markets
with additive production, where the worth of a good is the same to everyone; that is, the input
of player j has value ai,j = vj for any player i. In tit-for-tat, each player decides in what
fractions to split its good among its neighbours, and then updates the fractions in the next
round proportionally to the contribution of each good in its production. Examples from the
simulation of economies for two and three players are given in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
(a) Fractions yj,i(t) for all i, j over 70 rounds. (b) Fractions yj,i(t) for all i, j over 250 rounds.
(c) Amount of good 1 over time. (d) Amount of good 2 over time.
Figure 2: Tit-for-tat dynamic in an economy with n = 2 players, where v = [0.91, 1.186].
Each player i starts with an initial amount xi(0) = 1 of good i. The initial fractions are
~y(0) = [[0.95, 0.05], [0.55, 0.45]], where yj,i(t) is the fraction received by player i from good j at
time t. The players repeatedly exchange goods, produce from the bundles acquired, and then
update the fractions according to the tit-for-tat rule.
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(a) Fractions yj,i(t) over T = 200 rounds. (b) Amounts over T = 30 rounds. The amount of
good 1 shown in black, good 2 in blue, and good
3 in red.
Figure 3: Tit-for-tat dynamic in an economy with n = 3 players, where v =
[1.61, 0.03, 1.51], the initial amounts are xi(0) = 1, and the initial fractions are ~y(0) =
[[0.54, 0.2, 0.26], [0.32, 0.31, 0.37], [0.07, 0.54, 0.39]], where yj,i(t) is the fraction received by player
i from good j at time t. The players repeatedly exchange goods, produce from the bundles ac-
quired, and then update the fractions according to the tit-for-tat rule. Note the fractions yj,i(t)
in subfigure (a) have large oscillations initially.
We study the phase transitions and give an exact characterization of which players grow
or vanish over time. In particular, if v∗ is the maximum value of any good in the economy,
then the amounts of all the players i with vi > 1/v
∗ grow in the limit. On the other hand, the
players i with vi < 1/v
∗ have vanishing amounts in the limit. If vi = 1/v∗ then the amount of
player i stays in a bounded region throughout time. We also study how the fractions of their
investments evolve in the long term, showing that in the limit the players invest their good only
on the players with optimal production capacity.
1.1 Related Work
Tit-for-tat. The tit-for-tat dynamic was studied before in pure exchange markets (without
production) by Wu and Zhang [WZ07], where there is a set of players, such that each player i
owns one unit of good i. The players have additive valuations given by a matrix ~a, where ai,j is
the value of player i for a unit of good j. Each player repeatedly brings to the market one unit of
a good in order to exchange it for other goods that are potentially more valuable. In tit-for-tat
each player decides in what fractions to split its good among its neighbours, and then updates
the fractions in the next round proportionally to the utility received from each neighbour. The
main result in [WZ07] is that when the valuations are symmetric 1 the dynamic converges to
market equilibria for all non-degenerate starting configurations. The work in [BDR19] further
showed the tit-for-tat dynamic cycles in exchange economies with non-symmetric valuations.
Proportional response. A related dynamic studied in markets is proportional response, in
which every player starts with some amount of good and an initial budget of money that it
can use for acquiring goods. In each round, the players split their budget into bids on the
goods, then each good is allocated to each player in proportion to the bid amount and the seller
collects the money made from selling. In the exchange economy, each player updates their bids
on the goods in proportion to the contribution of each good in their utility; there, the dynamic
converges to market equilibria [BDR19] for any economy with additive valuations. In Fisher
markets, proportional response converges to market equilibria, which was shown for additive
1Symmetric valuations are such that the value of any player i for a good j is ai,j = vj .
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valuations in [Zha11] and for all CES valuations by [CCT18]. In Fisher markets with additive
valuations, the proportional response dynamic is equivalent to gradient descent [BDX11].
In production markets with additive production, the proportional response dynamic was
shown in [BMN18] to lead to universal growth of the market, where the amount of goods
produced grows over time (whenever growth is possible), but also to growing inequality between
the players on the most efficient production cycle and the rest. In particular, the dynamic learns
through local interactions a global feature of the exchange graph—the cycle with the highest
geometric mean.
Tatonement. Another central dynamic studied in markets is tatonement, which has been
studied in a series of papers on markets for players with additive, CES (constant elasticity of
substitution), and Leontief valuations [CCT18, CCD19, CF08]. Tatonement does not prescribe
how allocations may be formed, but defines how prices are adapted depending on the demand
in the previous round. The Shapley-Shubik game [SS77], which forms the basis of the propor-
tional response dynamic, was studied in static Fisher and exchange settings for its equilibrium
qualities [JT04, FLZ05, BGM17].
2 Model
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players, so that each player i can make good i using as
ingredients various amounts of goods in the system. The production recipe is given by a vector
~v, so that player i can make vj units of its good given one unit of good j
2.
The tit-for-tat dynamic is defined next. Note that there is no money involved; instead, each
player decides how to allocate its good among the players in the economy, and then updates its
fractions depending on what it received from the other players.
Definition 1 (Tit-for-tat Dynamic). Each good i is worth vi to every player j. The initial
amount of good i is xi(0). Each player i starts by allocating its good in initial fractions ~yi(0).
At each time t, the following steps take place:
• Exchange. Every player i receives an amount wi,j(t) = yj,i(t) ·xj(t) of each good j, where
yj,i(t) is the fraction given by player j to player i (from good j) in round t.
• Production. Each player i produces its good from the bundle acquired:
xi(t + 1) =
n∑
j=1
vj · wi,j(t) .
• Fractions update. Each player i updates the fraction it gives to player j according to
the contribution of good j in its production:
yi,j(t + 1) =
vj · wi,j(t)
xi(t + 1)
.
The starting configuration is non-degenerate: xi(0) > 0 and yj,i(0) > 0 for all i, j.
Definition 2 (Growth and decay). A player i grows if limt→∞ xi(t) = ∞ and vanishes if
limt→∞ xi(t) = 0, respectively.
Definition 3 (Optimal good). A good i is valuable if vi > 1 and optimal if vi ≥ vj for all
j ∈ [n]. Define v∗ = maxi∈[n] vi.
2Note that in the most general case of additive production, there is a matrix ~a so that player i can make ai,j
units of good i given one unit of good j.
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(a) Fractions yj,i(t) in a 5 player economy. (b) Fractions yj,i(t) in a 10 player economy.
(c) Fractions yj,i(t) in a 25 player economy. (d) Fractions yj,i(t) in a 50 player economy.
Figure 4: Fractions yj,i(t), for all i, j, in four markets with n = 5 players (a), n = 10 players
(b), n = 25 players (c), and n = 50 players (d) over time. Recall yj,i(t) is the fraction received
by player i from good j at time t; each color represents one trajectory of yj,i(t) for some pair
(i, j). Note some trajectories have very large fluctuations before converging and so appear as a
region.
3 Long Term Behavior
We characterize the rate of growth for each player as follows.
Theorem 1. Consider an economy with n players following the tit-for-tat dynamic. Recall
v∗ = maxj∈[n] vj. Then for each player i there exist constants ci, di > 0 so that the amount of
good i satisfies
ci · (vi · v∗)bt/2c ≤ xi(t) ≤ di · (vi · v∗)bt/2c, for all t ∈ N
In particular, the amount of good i grows over time if vi > 1/v
∗, vanishes if vi < 1/v∗, and
stays in a bounded region throughout time if vi = 1/v
∗.
Proof. From the update rule in Definition 1, it follows that for each pair of players (i, j) we
have
yi,j(t + 1)
yj,i(t)
= vj · xj(t)
xi(t + 1)
and
yj,i(t)
yi,j(t)
= vi · xi(t− 1)
xj(t)
(1)
Multiplying the two identities in (1) gives
yi,j(t + 1)
yi,j(t− 1) = (vi · vj) ·
xi(t− 1)
xi(t + 1)
(2)
We consider two cases. If t = 2` + 1, then from (2) we get
t∏
`=1
yi,j(2` + 1)
yi,j(2`− 1) =
t∏
`=1
(vi · vj) · xi(2`− 1)
xi(2` + 1)
=⇒ yi,j(2` + 1)
yi,j(1)
= (vi · vj)` · xi(1)
xi(2` + 1)
(3)
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Rewriting (3) we obtain
xi(2` + 1) · yi,j(2` + 1) = (vi · vj)` · xi(1) · yi,j(1) (4)
Let i∗ be a player with maximum value good: vi∗ = v∗. Recall yi,j(t) ≤ 1 for all i, j. By taking
j = i∗ in equation (4) we get
xi(2` + 1) =
(vi · vi∗)` · xi(1) · yi,i∗(1)
yi,i∗(2` + 1)
≥ (vi · vi∗)` · xi(1) · yi,i∗(1) (5)
Thus there is a constant c˜i > 0 so that
xi(2` + 1) ≥ c˜i · (vi · v∗)` for each ` ∈ N (6)
To upper bound the amount of good i, recall that
∑n
j=1 yi,j(t) = 1. By summing over all j
in equation (4) we get:
n∑
j=1
xi(2` + 1) · yi,j(2` + 1) =
n∑
j=1
(vi · vj)` · xi(1) · yi,j(1) ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
xi(2` + 1) =
n∑
j=1
(vi · vj)` · xi(1) · yi,j(1) ≤
n∑
j=1
(vi · v∗)` · xi(1) · 1 = n · xi(1) · (vi · v∗)` ⇐⇒
xi(2` + 1) ≤ xi(1) · (vi · v∗)` (7)
By taking d˜i = xi(1) > 0, we get xi(2` + 1) ≤ d˜i · (vi · v∗)` for each `. Together with (6), this
implies that for each player i there exist constants c˜i, d˜i > 0 so that
c˜i · (vi · v∗)` ≤ xi(2` + 1) ≤ d˜i · (vi · v∗)` (8)
If t = 2`, then the identity in (2) gives
yi,j(2`)
yi,j(0)
= (vi · vj)` · xi(0)
xi(2`)
(9)
From (9) there exist constants c′i, d
′
i so that c
′
i · (vi · v∗)` ≤ xi(2`) ≤ d′i · (vi · v∗)` for all ` ∈ N.
By combining the cases of even and odd t it follows that there exist ci, di > 0 so that
ci · (vi · v∗)bt/2c ≤ xi(t) ≤ di · (vi · v∗)bt/2c, for all t ∈ N (10)
This gives the required long term behavior for the sequence xi(t).
Remark 1. Every player with a valuable good grows in the limit. This follows from Theorem 1.
It can also be shown directly by considering the potential function gi(t) = xi(t) · yi,i(t) for each
player i and noting that gi(t) = v
t
i · gi(0). Then xi(t) = vti · gi(0)/yi,i(t), and so for vi > 1 we
get limt→∞ xi(t) =∞.
Note, however, that players may grow even if their production coefficient is less than one as
long as it is above a minimum threshold. Thus the dynamic supports some diversity in the set
of players that survive in the long run.
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(a) Fractions yj,i(t) in a 100 player economy. (b) Fractions yj,i(t) in a 100 player economy.
Figure 5: Fractions yj,i(t), for all i, j, in two economies with n = 100 players over 50 rounds
(a) and 300 rounds (b). Recall yj,i(t) is the fraction received by player i from good j at time t.
Note the fractions have large oscillations.
We also show that in the limit, each player sends its good only to those players with optimal
production.
Corollary 1. Let i be any player and j any player with sub-optimal production, i.e. with vj <
v∗. Then player i gives a fraction of 0% of its good to player j in the limit: limt→∞ yi,j(t) = 0.
Proof. Using identity (4) and inequality (10) in Theorem 1, for each player i we get
yi,j(2` + 1) = (vi · vj)` · xi(1) · yi,j(1)
xi(2` + 1)
≤ (vi · vj)` · xi(1) · yi,j(1)
di · (vi · v∗)`
=
xi(1) · yi,j(1)
di
·
(vj
v∗
)`
(11)
For any j with vj < v
∗, taking the limit of `→∞ in (11) gives lim`→∞ yi,j(2`+ 1) = 0. We can
similarly use (9) and inequality (10) in Theorem 1 to show that yi,j(2`) =
xi(0)·yi,j(0)
di
·
(
vj
v∗
)`
,
which gives lim`→∞ yi,j(2`) = 0. Thus limt→∞ yi,j(t) = 0.
Note that even though all the fractions yi,j(t) eventually converge to 0 or 1, in the examples
shown there are large fluctuations in the initial periods.
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